講座主題：Information Provision For Rewards-Based Crowdfunding Under Competition
主講人：薛巍立 教授 東南大學
摘要：This paper investigates the information provision strategy by price signaling for an entrepreneur who designs a reward based crowdfunding campaign for an innovation product facing the potential risk being plagiarized. Specifically, we develop and analyze a two period game theoretic model with a creator, who initially shares his business campaign in a crowdfunding platform but can strategically release information about its product through price signaling, and an imitator, who begins developing a competing product as soon as it become aware of the creator’s product. We characterize the conditions under which the creator can signaling his product information. We find that the creator should strategically disclose his product quality information by trading off between the success in the crowdfunding stage and the competition intensity in the regular sale stage. Specifically, it is interesting to show that the creator with high quality can benefit by conceal its product quality information and mislead the imitator, while the one with low quality, on the contrary, may benefit if she discloses her product quality information. Moreover, we discuss how information asymmetry and signaling affect pricing decision by creators, quality decision by imitator, and consumer surplus when comparing to the result under full information.
主講人簡介: 薛巍立，東南大學經濟管理學院教授、博導，國家自然科學基金優秀青年科學基金獲得者，中國民主同盟中央青年委員會委員;目前為中國系統工程學會會員，物流系統工程專業委員會委員，中國自動化學會經濟與管理系統專業委員會會員，中國管理現代化研究會運作管理專業委員會會員等。 本科與碩士均畢業于南京大學數學系，博士畢業于香港中文大學系統工程與工程管理系，主要從事供應鏈物流管理、數據驅動的決策優化、服務運營管理等。發表SCI/SSCI論文20多篇，包括 Operations Research、Production and Operations Management、Transportation Science等國際知名期刊;主持了多項國家級及省部級科研項目等等。